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An Approach to the Revision of the
Louisiana Civil Code*
CLARENCE J.

MORROWt

The prospective revision of the Louisiana Civil Code potentially will produce the most important document in the history of
American private law-I repeat, the most important document in
the history of American private law. This is not said lightly, or
hastily, or merely for the sake of having something to say on this
occasion. Rather, it is based upon a careful consideration which
has convinced me thoroughly that the Louisiana State Law Institute has a heavy and serious responsibility, of which it may have
to be convinced in turn, not only to this state, but to the nation
and the world, in undertaking this revision. My purpose will be
to try, insofar as it may be possible in a single brief paper, to
impart that conviction to you.'
*An address which was delivered on May 5, 1949 at the annual meeting of
the Louisiana State Law Institute, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. At the request
of the Louisiana State Law Institute, this address is being published by both
the Tulane Law Review and the Louisiana Law Review.
tProfessor of Law, College of Law, Tulane University.
1 This paper is published as it was delivered, and no documentation has
been attempted. However, a partial bibliography of material concerning some
of the problems discussed herein, of particular interest to Louisiana readers,
would include: Franklin, The Historic Function of the American Law Institute; Restatement as Transitional to Codification, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1367
(1934); Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method
for State and Nation, 17 Tulane L. Rev. 351, 537 (1943); Franklin, Concerning the Historic Importance of Edward Livingston, 11 Tulane L. Rev.
163 (1937); Morrison, The Need For a Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code,
11 Tulane L. Rev. 213 (1937); Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised,
11 Tulane L. Rev. 585 (1937); Comment, Stare Decisis in Louisiana, 7 Tulane
L. Rev. 100 (1932); Symposium (Daggett, Dainow, Hebert, McMahon): A
Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 Tulane
L. Rev. 12 (1937); Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21,
9 Tulane L. Rev. 485 (1935); Franklin, Review of Dart's Civil Code of Louisiana, 7 Tulane L. Rev. 632 (1933); Franklin, Review of Restatement of Law
of Contracts, 8 Tulane L. Rev. 149 (1933); Morrow, The Proposed Louisiana
Criminal Code-An Opportunity and a Challenge, 15 Tulane L. Rev. 415
(1941); Morrow, Louisiana Annotations to the Restatement of the Law of
Torts, 16 Tulane L. Rev. 644 (1942); Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana:
From What Sources Does It Derive, 16 Tulane L. Rev. 489 (1942); Stone,
Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Materials for the Decision of a Case, 17
Tulane L. Rev. 159 (1942); Stone, Teaching Law Comparatively, 22 Tulane
L. Rev. 158 (1947); Beutel, The Necessity of a New Technique of Interpreting
the N. I. L.-The Civil Law Analogy, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 1 (1931); Morrow,
The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942-Opportunities Lost and Challenges
Yet Unanswered, 17 Tulane L. Rev. 1 (1942); Morrow, The 1942 Louisiana
Criminal Code in 1945: A Small Voice From the Past, 19 Tulane L. Rev. 483
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The basic, historical pattern is familiar to all. Partly through
happy accident and partly through the wise design of our predecessors, Louisiana inherited the French Civil Code of 1804, which
has been celebrated universally as the greatest and most influential legal document the world has ever known. That code brought
to us, as it has to all who have received it, the culmination of the
world's most mature legal system: representing, in substance, the
Roman law with its centuries of experience and development,
and, in form, a legal text consciously and deliberately formulated
on the basis of all the known techniques of its day. This state
was one of the first heirs of that Code, and it placed us, in our
infancy as a jurisdiction, literally hundreds of years in advance
of our neighbors. At first we were worthy heirs. In the first
quarter of the 19th century we acted as though we had some
appreciation of the value of our legacy. During the career of
Edward Livingston the Code was fortunately in the hands of one
of the great legal scholars of history, who preserved it at a crucial
time in its life and attempted to accommodate it to the somewhat
strange new situation in which it was placed. Whether the Louisiana Code, as thus accommodated, represented in every sense
an advance over the French Code is debatable, but there was
certainly no retrogression, and whatever was done was the result
of careful planning, utilizing all the resources afforded by the
time and place. In fact, bold new action was taken: other, companion Codes were drafted, attention was given to the problem
of legal method, and plans for constant recodification were put
forward. In short, law men in Louisiana in 1825 approached the
problems we are now considering on a level which has never
been approximated since that time.
But these are familiar matters, learned early in our legal education, and recalled quite vividly on those occasions when we
wax emotional and nostalgic about the Code. Most of the time
we incline to forget the rest of the story. While wisdom may
have combined with accident to introduce and preserve the Code
in Louisiana in the early years, we must admit, if we are to be
completely honest with ourselves, that accident rather than wisdom has predominated in the last century. We know that the
Code all but disintegrated during the 19th and early 20th cen(1945); Morrow, Civilian Codification Under Judicial Review: The Generality
of "Immorality" in Louisiana, 21 Tulane L. Rev. 545 (1947); Stone, The
Loesch Case and Article 667, 17 Tulane L. Rev. 596 (1943); Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Aggressor Doctrine, 21 Tulane L. Rev. 362 (1947);
Hubert, A Louisiana Anomaly-The "Writ" System in Real Actions, 22 Tulane L. Rev. 459 (1948).
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turies, and this was only partly because of traditional legal inertia in the face of changing social and economic conditions. The
major factors in the decline of the civil law system of which the
Code was the most important part were not merely isolation
from other civil law jurisdiction, lack of civil law libraries, lack
of civil law scholarship, but, most serious, lack of concerted effort
to overcome these disadvantages and lack of understanding of
the necessity for resisting common law infiltration. By the twentieth century, the result was that the Code was venerated more
because it was ours and because it made us somewhat "different," than because of any appreciation of its true value. Legal
chauvinism and local pride, rather than sympathetic understanding, dominated our early twentieth century thinking about
the Code and its future. We feared that we did not really know
enough about its mysteries to discard it, so we tended to ignore
it, or bypass it by means of other legislation, or hide it beneath
a gloss of jurisprudential concepts which too often derived from
common law sources. Our so-called "precious heritage" had
became a "precarious heritage," indeed, by the end of the first
quarter of this century.
However, it cannot be denied that a renaissance of the civil
law has taken place in the last twenty years. While it could not
be expected that a miracle could be wrought in that interval, the
accomplishments have not been inconsiderable. Modem law
schools have been trying to teach not only a practical knowledge
of the substance of the Code, but an appreciation and understanding of it upon a theoretical level. Attention is now given
to the form and construction of the Code, and to the civil law
method of interpretation so necessary to its survival. The Code
is revealed not as a dying curiosity but as a dynamic instrument
of tremendous potentialities, despite its 'obsolescence. Modem
law reviews have striven admirably to overcome the deficiencies
of a century and to supply the doctrinal writing so essential to
a civil law system, as well as to reconstruct the historical, cultural and intellectual base upon which the system must rest.
This Institute has been a tremendous factor in this renaissance.
Not only has it made contributions like those of the law schools
and law reviews, such as research and translation projects, but
it has been the medium for translating all these efforts into practical action in the field of legislation. It is now engaged in the
preparation of revisions of the statutes and of the Constitution,
-and it has already produced an entirely original Criminal Code
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which can compare without discredit' with similar codes. There
are signs that the Institute is becoming increasingly aware of
its role as the missing feature of Livingston's plan for creating
in this state the completely mature legal system, and signs that
it is prepared to assume that role. The next step is clear. It is
the destiny of this Institute to revise the Louisiana Civil Code,
and no matter how we view the task it is plain that we are at
the cross-roads. This body shall either go forward on the basis
of the auspicious prelude of the last twenty years which have
been devoted to recapturing our earlier position of advantage,
or it shall discard these initial successes, reverse the recent trend,
and allow our legal fortunes to relapse into the low estate in
which the early twentieth century found them.
This paper is a plea that the trend be not reversed-that we
go forward and not backward. What is involved in "going forward"? As yet no way exists of proving scientifically that "progress" in law lies in one .direction rather than in another, or that
one form of positive law is superior to another. Any decision to
be made will be made on the basis of a combination of limited
human experience, faulty human reason, and obscure human intuition. Yet, objectives desirable to the great majority of us can
be quickly stated in general terms. Certainly in Louisiana there
can be no doubt that we all, though we may have different reasons, are united in our determination to preserve a codified source
of law; there is no thought of abandoning the Code. But this alone
does not make us unique any longer. Everywhere, through the
force of necessity if not through conscious design, law men are
turning to legislation as the accepted form of the positive law of
the future. The battle is likely to center now around the precise
form the legislation shall assume, rather than around the question
of legislation or no legislation. Here as well, however, our general
objectives are not subject to debate in this state. We are happily
committed to comprehensive Codes rather than to piece-meal, miscellaneous statutes. We probably would agree generally that we
should seek to obtain the most useful and efficient legal mechanism human ingenuity can devise: a Code at once as comprehensive and yet as brief as possible; a Code which will be professional
and technical to a necessary degree, and yet possess such clarity
and simplicity that it will be comprehensible to laymen and rest
upon popular will; a Code which will combine a maximum of consistency, predictability and certainty with a maximum of flexi-
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bility and susceptibility to growth and necessary change. That is
the ideal-that way legal "progress" lies.
It is in the search for the easiest path to the realization of this
ideal that opinions will differ and the controversies will arise. But
it is obvious to me that the path we are seeking lies in the direction of the fulfillment of our destiny as a civil law jurisdiction. In
other words my suggestion for attaining our common goal is to
give new impetus to the civil law renaissance in Louisiana, for
thereby we eventually shall reap the fruit of that renaissance in
the form of the greatest Civil Code which has ever been formulated. I do not believe it is naivete, or provincialism, or legal
chauvinism which causes me to take this position. It is rather a
realization, on the basis of years of study of comparative law, that
civil law substantive concepts, civil law formulation of legislation, and civil law method are vastly more effective than their
common law counterparts in achieving the ideal I suggested above
as the common goal of. most law men. This is a realization shared
by substantially all comparative law scholars. Time and space do
not permit detailed development of this point, but suffice it to say
that the civil law concepts of substantive law-the "rules" and
"principles" of law, if you like-products of centuries of development in ancient and modern Roman law-are more rational, more
keen and incisive in their analyses, and more efficient tools for the
solution of conflicts of interests, than common law substantive
concepts. The latter, even when they lead to the same conclusions
(which they do not always do by any means), are more likely to
involve technical distinctions which have merely historical bases,
useless fictions and formalisms, survivals of feudalism, endless
difficulties caused by the irrational division into law on the one
hand and equity on the other, and other products of immaturity
in legal systems. No less important is the form of civilian Codes
as compared with the legislation of common law jurisdictions.
Civilian codification alone, through the use of conscious legislative
techniques, produces the requisite comprehensiveness coupled
with brevity, simplicity and clarity of expression. Contrast, if you
will, the form of a series of articles in the French or Louisiana
Code with a series of sections from typical Anglo-American statutes or with sections of some Restatement of the American Law
Institute. Or, for a modem Louisiana experiment, compare the
form of the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942 with that of any socalled Criminal Code in the United States today. With reference
to legal method, compare the results under the civil law method
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which unfortunately we have so largely abandoned in Louisiana,
with that of Anglo-American law. While the civilian does not dignify the judge as a creator of law, he assigns him the equally important task of decision of each individual case, not by reference
to other decisions, but by reference to legislative texts and within
the limits of such judicial discretion as the legislative texts grant.
One result, for example, is the brief French judicial report. Since
the Anglo-American theory of stare decisis applies under statutory law as well as under common law, the judge in this country
labors in all cases under the double burden of looking backward
and forward at the same time, and the ever increasing results of
his labor pour forth in an unending stream, overtaxing our library
shelves and our pocketbooks, to the delight of law book publishing companies, which capitalize upon the sad delusions of those
who search for the case "exactly in point."
I am suggesting, then, that we continue to turn to civil law
experience as a basis for going forward. This will mean that our
models in the revision of the Civil Code will be not only the Code
Napoleon and our own present Code, but also the great modern
Codes of Europe: the German Civil Code, the Swiss Code of
Obligations, the new Italian and Greek Codes, and, of course, the
revised French Civil Code which is now in preparation. If we take
this course, we shall make the following approaches to six important specific problems about which I have chosen to make
suggestions. These six are: (1) the period of time to be devoted to
the project; (2) the preliminary work to be done by this Institute;
(3) the substance of the Revised Code; (4) the form of the Revised Code; (5) the theoretical base for the Revised Code; (6) an
informational campaign to be conducted collaterally by this
Institute.
(1) In the first place we must regard the Revision of the
Civil Code as a long term project. By this time the Institute
should be a "going concern" in the eyes of the public and of the
legislature and there should not be any necessity whatever for the
frantic haste which has characterized the work on some of the
projects. The process of drafting the German Civil Code consumed
twenty years. While it has never been thought necessary to devote such a lengthy period to the formulation of any of the well
known Civil Codes since that time-largely because the subsequent codes had the benefit of the German experience-nevertheless the drafting has always involved a very substantial period.
I would say that we should not even consider devoting less than
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five years to the project, computed from the time that drafting
actually begins until the submission to the legislature, and, in my
opinion, it would be preferable to think in terms of a period closer
to ten years.
(2) Next, for a considerable period before actual drafting
begins, this Institute must continue to promote in every way it
can all of the various preparatory activities which have been going on for the past twenty years. By this I mean the Institute
must continue to cooperate with law schools in their efforts to produce a civil law renaissance in the state. This could be done in
many ways. For example, the stimulation of civil law and comparative law research in the law schools, both by graduate students and by undergraduate members of law review editorial
boards, would be a great step forward. Perhaps this could be accomplished by establishing scholarships, fellowships or even cash
prizes to be awarded to meritorious recipients. Not only original
preliminary research and doctrinal writing are important, however. One of the greatest preparatory tasks of this Institute will
be to supply adequate translations, not only of some basic civilian
treatise, such as the Planiol project, but also translations of many
of the modern Civil Codes of Europe and Latin America which
have not yet been translated into English, to say nothing of translations of any preliminary drafts of the Revised French Code.
Such activities of the Institute will take time, but they are essential to any intelligent revision of the Louisiana Code, and there
seems to be no reason why, once capable personnel can be obtained, such projects could not start very soon.
(3) When at length we come to the actual formulation of a
revised Civil Code for Louisiana, certain broad issues will inevitably arise, many of which can be anticipated even now. Since they
are so sure to arise, I do not feel that it is presumptuous on my
part to mention some of them and indicate how I believe they
must be disposed of under my conception of the task which I have
been asked to outline at this time.
First, as to the substance of the Revised Code, I assume that
it must be basically that of the present Code of 1870, but I assume
also that there should be sweeping changes throughout. To put it
another way, I assume we are interested in a modern civil code
and not in a Restatement. Certainly many of the present texts of
the Code could be omitted altogether without loss, sometimes because they are obsolete, but more often because they are merely
expository and thus have no place in a modem code. Much of
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this expository material (derived from early French commentators) was added in 1825, apparently in an effort to explain to a
relatively untutored bench and bar some of the mysteries of
French civil law theory as expressed in the somewhat laconic
Code Napoleon. Modern civil law assigns the task of exposition to
the motifs of the Code or to subsequent doctrinal writing, and
there is no place for such material in the code itself.
In determining which of the remaining substantive texts of
the Code shall be kept intact, obviously policy considerations will
be involved, and, of course, it would not be appropriate for me to
say now, even if time permitted, what my proposed solution of any
considerable number of concrete problems as a matter of policy
would be. However, I would urge now that in the selection of
substantive concepts to be included in the Code, very close attention should be given to many concepts which have been developed
on the continent since the drafting of the Code Napoleon and
which represent, in my opinion, both desirable solutions and practical, efficient methods of achieving those solutions. For example,
I cannot imagine a blind retention of our existing concept of lesion
without first thoroughly exploring the development that concept
has had on the continent-a development from which we have
beein precluded by. the rigidity of our own Code's concept of
lesion. In other words, before we retain any single concept of our
present Code unchanged, we should be sure that, following a comparative survey of all analogous concepts in other, more modern
Civil Codes, no more desirable solution, or no more effective way
of reaching the same solution, can be found.
In this connection, the question will, of course, arise of the
extent, if any, to which modern common law concepts should be
employed in the Revised Code. In my opinion, they should by all
means be examined with great care, particularly those chosen for
inclusion in modern Uniform Acts like the Commercial Code,
which is now in the drafting stage. Without wishing to prejudge
any such concepts dogmatically, however, I am very dubious
about the prospect of making any real gains from such sources.
In most fields, the Code Napoleon itself was ahead of the present
common law, and even where the common law concept is quite
admirable and acceptable in its own context, rarely is it advantageous to uproot it and to try to place it in a civil law context,
where it is likely to produce inconsistencies and contradictions.
A more difficult decision lies ahead in determining to what
extent the Revised Code should embrace common law concepts
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which either the Code of 1870 or the jurisprudence may be said
to have accepted already. Actually the Code has accepted very
few. The example usually given is the common law concept of
"consideration," since the Louisiana Code repeatedly uses the
term, frequently in referring to the enforceability vel non of
promises. The fact is, however, that the term is never used in the
common law sense, but was intended to be (and in some articles is
stated to be synonymous with civil law "cause," so that any
Louisiana decisions accepting technical common law consideration as a standard for the enforceability of promises are based
upon a spurious interpretation of the Code. A clarification is certainly needed, and in my opinion, clarification in the form of the
complete suppression of the "consideration" concept. In other instances, the acceptance of common law concepts has been accomplished in the jurisprudence without any pretext of following code
authority. Sometimes this has been done upon the theory that the
Code is silent on the point, or, just as frequently, by simply ignoring what the Code does have to say. For example, the rights of
third purchasers of movable property have been determined quite
often in this state by applications of the common law "bona fide
purchase" doctrine. Admittedly, the Code's treatment of this
problem is very inadequate, but it is certainly not silent on the
subject, at least not to a court trained in civil law interpretation
by analogy. In any event, the introduction of the concept of a
"bona fide purchase," the application of which is based on a distinction between "legal" title and "equitable" title, in a civil law
jurisdiction, which has never had such a distinction, is perfectly
absurd. This is the type of common law concept which must be
utterly destroyed in any revision of the Code. Still another set of
instances in which common law concepts have been employed
have arisen in fields where Louisiana courts have simply failed to
understand the purposes and advantages of the Civil Code's approach to the problem. For example, in the field of tort, the marvelous simplicity of Articles 2315 and following of the Code has
been smothered and obliterated by repeated unnecessary judicial
excursions into particularized common law doctrines such as "last
clear chance," "res ipsa loquitur" and "attractive nuisance." The
whole theory of the Civil Code articles on delictual responsibility
rests upon the notion that this field requires a minimum of predictability in advance and a maximum of individualization of decision, and thus that only broad standards need be provided in
the Code. Yet, to read the jurisprudence, one would often think
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the courts of this state were bound by the Torts Restatement
rather than by the Code, so thoroughly have they become insulated from the Code's original theory by a mass of case law based
on common law sources. In some instances, this has led to the
acceptance of concepts in direct contravention of the Code articles,
as in the acceptance of contributory negligence. In my opinion,
the Code revision should seize the opportunity to restore Louisiana to the civil law in this field as well, and once again it would
be necessary to do a thorough housecleaning of unnecessarily imported common law concepts.
The next reference I wish to make to matters of substance in
the Revised Code is related to the last point. I have said that the
jurisprudence which finds its basis in non-civil law sources should
be suppressed. What about the jurisprudence which purports to
be based solely on the Code, as much of it does, for example, in
community property and family law? To what extent shall this
portion of the jurisprudence be drawn upon in selecting substantive concepts for the Revised Code? A tremendous temptation will
be felt to "restate" a great deal of this material, and thus turn the
Revised Code into a glorified digest, in which the existing Code
articles will become merely a framework upon which to hang the
jurisprudence. If this approach should be taken, in my opinion, it
would be far better not to undertake the revision project at all.
A careful, minute study of the jurisprudence must be made, of
course, but rather for the purpose of revealing defects, omissions
and inconsistencies of various sorts in the Code, than for the purpose of discovering precise, concrete rules for the decision of every
conceivable fact situation which has arisen in the state. That is,
the jurisprudence is a splendid record of the law in action: what
texts of the Code have proved obscure and inadequate, what problems are not provided for in the Code, which texts have given too
great judicial discretion and which too little, and so forth. As
Livingston put it, the jurisprudence is a continuing report to the
legislature of the success or failure of various portions of the
Code. Any greater reliance than this upon the jurisprudence in
any Code revision would, in my opinion, be unwarranted.
No reference to the problem of selecting substantive concepts
for the new Code would be complete without pointing out the
obvious fact that today there are modern, scientific bases for legislation, either unknown or ignored even two or three decades ago.
Surely the point in the so-called "integration" of law and science
has been reached where we can at least consider seriously the
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recommendations of sociologists in determining our family law
concepts, or the suggestions of business economists in striving for
the most desirable solutions of troublesome problems such as the
ranking of privileges. The prospective revision of the Code must
exhaust the possibilities of assistance from both the physical and
social sciences in formulating, if necessary, entirely new substantive concepts for inclusion in the Code.
(4) What should be the form of the Revised Code? It seems
clear that on the basis of the experience of other modern Civil
Codes the old arrangement of the Code Napoleon has fallen into
disfavor, and it is unlikely that even the current revision of the
French Code will retain it. Once the desirability of a rearrangement should be agreed upon, the way would be open for a significant advance.
Generalization is the soul of civilian codification. The success
of such codification depends in large measure, then, upon the
extent to which useful generalizations can be devised and the
extent to which they can be employed together in appropriate
combinations. The ultimate in such civilian technique is to provide
a master set of generalizations called a "General Part," which
shall apply throughout the whole Code. This approach was used
in the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942, with the consequence that
general provisions concerning criminal intent, criminal negligence, incapacities of various sorts to commit crimes, defenses
and justifications applicable to all crimes, the law of attempts to
commit crimes, and so forth, were all set forth at the outset in a
"General Part." This method has been used with great effectiveness in civil codes as well, as illustrated by the German and other
modern civil codes. It seems clear that these experiences in other
jurisdictions are full of significance for us, and any intelligent
revision of our Code will not fail to take account of them. The
German Civil Code has demonstrated that it is possible to create
a concept of the "legal transaction" in general, including contracts, donations, wills, adoptions, et cetera, and then to state
generally for all "legal transactions" the legal consequences of
lack of capacity, lack of requisite form, illegality, vices of consent, and so forth. The extent to which we shall wish to follow
this example should be a major inquiry in all of our thinking
about Code revision.
Even in the "Special Part," as disinguished from the "General
Part" to which I have just referred, however, the problem of the
extent of generalization of expression as a matter of form will be
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ever present. In this regard, however, the problem will be easier,
for it will be a matter of keeping what we have, rather than trying to improve the form of our law by original action which may
be unfamiliar to many. The key to determining the extent of
generalization desirable in expressing particular Code articles
seems to lie in attempting to designate those fields of law which
demand a maximum of predictability and then in attempting to
provide the relatively narrow, precise rules for those fields. On
the other hand, where individualization of decision seems appropriate, the solution would appear to be to permit a maximum of
judicial discretion by providing only a broad legal standard
rather than a narrow legal rule. This has been the civilian method
of Code formulation ever since the Code Napoleon, and, happily,
therefore, this is already part of our heritage. Our Code is relatively detailed and particularized in its statement of rules concerning inheritance, property, and prescription, for example, and
properly so. But concerning the highly individualized problem of
substantial performance of contracts we find only the broadly
stated Articles 2046 and 2047 on the implied resolutory condition,
and concerning tort liability we find only the broad generalization
in Articles 2315-2324. It seems very clear to me that we must
preserve this approach in any revision, even though we must
beat down attempts to provide in the Code an exact result for
every case involving partial performance of contracts and even
though in the field of torts we must go beyond this and remove
the gloss of jurisprudence which has smothered Article 2315.
(5) In addition to these matters of form and substance, there
are a host of problems which are too numerous for detailed discussion at this time. Our present Code is either completely lacking or sadly deficient in provisions concerning its theory of law
and legal method. It is possible to eke these out from a few
articles scattered throughout the Code, and from the brief "preliminary provisions" in Articles 1 through 21. But these are so
obscurely stated in language enigmatical to all save legal scholars
that it has been easy to ignore them, and the acceptance of common law theories and method has been accelerated by this deficiency in statement of the Code's theoretical basis. The prospective Code revision should supply the necessary theoretical texts.
We must thrash out the problems of the respective roles of courts
and legislatures in creating law, of stare decisis, of the handling
of the "unprovided for" case, of interpretation by analogy and
otherwise, of the validity of the pre-existing jurisprudence as a
source of law, and many similar problems. When we have done
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so, appropriate texts must appear in the Code. We must provide
a complete and carefully prepared set of "motifs," or draftsmen's
notes, as an aid to interpretation. We must encourage additional
doctrinal writing on the subject of the Code, so that this necessary
source of reference in the civil law system will not be lacking as
it has been for so much of our present Code's history. And, no
matter how successful a Code we may think we have produced
at the conclusion of our labors, we must provide for its constant
recodification.
(6) The'last suggestion I have to make is perhaps the most
important, because it is intensely "practical." I have already said
that a Code revision such as I contemplate is a very long-term
project and that there are certain measures which this Institute
should be taking, both before the project actually begins and also
during its progress. My last point is this: If we believe that a
Code revision in the civilian manner is desirable, a collateral
undertaking by this Institute in the form of an informational
and educational campaign will be essential. We shall need the
ideas, advice, assistance, suggestions, and support of the bench
and bar of the state, and in turn we must provide the means for
reaching the members of the bench and bar on the local level to
explain what we are doing and why we are doing it, and to convince them that this is not merely some local, provincial project.
It is one of the great advantages of this Institute that it makes
such a campaign possible. Under the auspices of this body civil
law scholars and experts can be brought to Louisiana lecture platforms, local bar association discussion groups can be arranged,
published materials can be circulated, and bench and bar response
can be stimulated. I surely believe that such steps will be essential to any successful revision of the Code.
Let me point out that if we take the course of action I have
been describing we shall produce at once an efficient document
of Louisiana private law and also a significant contribution to
the legal progress of the world. And nothing less will do. The law
men of the nation and of the whole legal world expect nothing
less when Louisiana undertakes a project of this kind. It is a
truism to say that Louisiana is peculiarly situated geographically,
historically, culturally and legally. It is not so commonly understood that this fact gives us not only the opportunity, but the
responsibility as well, to accomplish things which cannot be
achieved elsewhere. We need not shrink from the task. Things
already have been done here which could not have been accom-
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plished elsewhere. It is no accident that we are sitting at this
moment in an assembly of an Institute of this kind, with its
record of achievement. Where else in the nation does its counterpart exist? Nor is it an accident that the Louisiana Criminal Code
of 1942 was adopted in this jurisdiction, rather than in some
other. These are but preliminary manifestations that, while we
and our legal tradition have known dark days, we are now ready
to assume our proper role and realize our destiny. Let me conclude with a plea that we shall continue to keep our sights on
the highest possible level.

